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  This paper provides a synthesis of recent literature dealing with the institutional 
environment, policy framework, and economic instruments used in policy analysis related 
to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity resources. .The paper analyzes the 
economic consequences of alternative policy options and summarizes the application of 
these economic issues in the formulation of biodiversity protection policy.  The paper 
also concludes that the proper understanding of underlying institutions and, if needed, 
institutional reforming procedures are also required to provide appropriate incentive 
structures for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity resources.  Illustrations of 
these principles and examples are taken from published accounts of biodiversity policy 
debates and policy implementations. 
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1.    Introduction 
Biological diversity conservation and sustainable development issues are major 
international concerns.  Recently, conservation of biological diversity has been 
recognized in the international community, including policy makers and scientists, as 
essential for the very survival of human beings on the planet.  In spite of increasing 
international concern for biodiversity conservation, especially after the United Nation’s 
Rio de Janeiro conference and subsequent Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 
1992, it is still not clear what institutional arrangement can effectively promote 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.  Many believe that ambiguous 
policies and programs focused on the agrarian sector worldwide are at the heart of the 
present crisis of biodiversity conservation.  The impacts of traditional methods of 
regulation and government intervention in the sector are often conflicting, and frequently 
adverse with respect of biodiversity protection.  
Among ecologists and natural scientists, however, there is at least a general 
consensus that maintaining a minimum level of biological diversity is of critical 
importance to the health of ecosystems and maintenance of the food chain for humans 
(Gowdy, 1997).  However, not all analysts and decision-makers give equal value to the 
preservation of biological diversity, especially while implementing policies and programs 
for economic development.  
  At least in principle, it is generally recognized by scientists and policy-makers 
that failure to properly understand the economic aspects of biodiversity resources and 
failure to reflect the social value of biodiversity resources in the market arena are some of 
the major reasons for the present worldwide crisis.  Therefore it is useful for experts from 
all disciplines to be concerned with the economic ramifications of biodiversity 
preservation.   4
  This paper provides a summary of recent literature dealing with the institutional 
environment, policy framework, and economic instruments used in policy analysis for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity resources.  The paper addresses the 
economic consequences of alternative policy options. The first part of the paper gives a 
general overview of the problem and summarizes the importance of biodiversity and 
recent international concerns.  The second part of the paper summarizes some of the 
major economic issues raised in recent literature pertaining to biodiversity.  Finally, the 
third part of the paper presents the major economic policy options for biodiversity 
programs.   
 
1.1  Background 
The term biodiversity denotes biological diversity, which is used to describe the 
number, variety and variability of living organisms in a given assemblage (Pearce and 
Dominic, 1994).  Biodiversity has several levels: genetic diversity, species diversity, 
ecosystem diversity, etc.  Biodiversity is defined by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and also UNEP (1993) as “the variability among living organisms from all 
sources, including, inter-alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and 
ecological complexes of which they are a part, which includes diversity within species, 
between species, and of ecosystems” ( Barbier, et al. 1995).  It is reported that about half 
of the world’s species are contained in just seven percent of the planet’s land surface 
(WRI, 1997a).  That means the pressure on terrestrial biodiversity is intense and it 
increases as human population needs for space grow over time.  
  Recently, as evidenced by the United Nations’ Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) held in 1992, and the CBD, the concern for biodiversity 
conservation has been increasing worldwide. This UN conference recommended the 
integration of conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity into all national and 
international economic decision-making processes and agreements.  As a result, 
international institutions have begun to design agreements recognizing that biological 
diversity resources have global significance.  The probability of preserving the natural 
global ecosystem is enhanced if the different levels of biodiversity are recognized and   5
given due economic value; thus creating adequate economic incentives for the 
conservation of these natural resources.   
Traditional methods of regulation and government intervention are ambiguous.  In 
general, the cost of biodiversity conservation is imposed on local communities, while 
most of the benefits accrue to a much broader constituency. Therefore, the issue of 
biodiversity conservation is a problem of managing global environmental resources 
through applications of local solutions.  Considering these facts, the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) was recently created to fund activities to protect 
biodiversity and natural habitats that would provide cost-effective benefits to the global 
environment. The GEF, administered by the World Bank, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), funds 
projects that otherwise would not be funded by individual nations because of the lower 
measurable benefits captured by the individual nations (Munasinghe, 1992; CBD, 1996a). 
 
1.2   Recent concerns and causes of biodiversity decline 
  There is no unanimous agreement among contemporary scientists, economists, 
and policy analysts on a theory that explains the process and implications of loss of 
biodiversity.  Even among ecologists and natural scientists, there is disagreement about 
the details of ecological impacts and the role of biodiversity for maintaining co- 
evolutionary and resilience functions of the ecosystem (Barbier et al., 1995; Swanson, 
1995).   However, the limited available literature suggests that the main driving forces 
behind the present level of biodiversity loss arise from human activities which can be 
further divided into: i) proximate causes such as hunting, fishing, habitat alternation and 
conversion; and ii) underlying causes such as social and cultural factors that lie behind 
economic activities (Barbier et al., 1995).  These underlying causes of biodiversity loss 
include the scale and growth of human population, culture and ethics, poverty, economic 
incentives, and institutions.  
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2.    Economic issues of biodiversity conservation 
Economics is concerned with the allocation of resources to meet human needs or 
to achieve human satisfactions.  Therefore, the resource allocation decision in economics 
is guided by anthropocentric values of resources.  Through this anthropocentric view 
economics can provide an important and useful perspective on biodiversity conservation 
(Barbier,  et al. , 1995; Randall, 1991;  McNeely, 1993).  In addition, economics can also 
provide a full range of information on costs and benefits of resource use associated with 
the provision of resource use choices.  
The biodiversity conservation policy of a society is closely linked to the 
development policy of the nation.  Biodiversity conservation programs involve a 
significant portion of state lands set aside as parks, reserves, protected areas, or as 
unharvested wild forests.  This implies that significant parcels of land remain under-
developed from a current time financial point of view.  Conservation programs impose 
significant opportunity costs, in terms of forgone extractive activities, on the surrounding 
local communities and the nation involved.  Successful conservation programs have to 
resolve this problem.  Such programs may have to provide compensation or other 
incentives to affected communities.  Otherwise, there will be pressure for land conversion 
and depletion of biodiversity resources.  Some of the major economic issues involved in 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity resources raised in the recent literature 
are summarized below.  
 
2.1  Conservation vs. economic development 
Norton-Griffin and Southey (1995) reported that national level opportunity costs 
of biodiversity conservation programs (protected area programs) in Kenya, estimated as  
forgone net returns from available farming opportunities, was US$ 203 million per year, 
in 1989 values, which comes close to three percent of annual GDP of Kenya.  Reduction 
of three percent of annual GDP is a substantial loss to Kenyan society.  This case study 
provides a good example illustrating the need of effective international cooperation for 
the long run success of such biodiversity conservation programs worldwide.  
Biodiversity conservation policy of a society is closely associated with sustainable 
development policy.  Development is any process by which welfare of a society is   7
improved over time (Pearce and Perrings, 1995).  The Brundtland Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) defines sustainable 
development as “development that meets the needs of present generations without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”  In this context 
sustainable development is then simply any infinite horizon process by which the welfare 
of a society is non-decreasing (Pezzy, 1992).  This provides a linkage between 
biodiversity conservation policy and sustainable development policy, such that 
biodiversity protection is viewed as the means of securing ecosystem resilience to ensure 
sustainable development.  
The development of ecological economics as a separate branch in economics has 
also provided different perspectives on the policy issues of biodiversity conservation.  In 
the literature of ecological economics it is recently recognized that there is a difference 
between economic growth and economic development, and that the traditional indicators 
of economic growth alone do not adequately measure the development process.  
However, we are still at the beginning of the ecological economics learning curve, and 
there are many aspects of biodiversity for which we do not have satisfactory answers; 
such as how diversity of genes, genotypes, species, and communities influence ecosystem 
functioning and its resilience capacity (Pearce and Perrings, 1995).  Here, ecological 
resilience means, in simple terms, the capacity of an ecosystem to recover from and thus 
absorb external shocks (Barbier, et al. 1995).  This implies that we are still far from 
discovering the optimum level (or minimum level) of biological diversity that is required 
in an area, or the planet as whole, to guarantee sustainable development. 
We can consider biological diversity resources as a part of the aggregate capital 
stock available for human exploitation.  Then, maintaining biodiversity preserves the 
available “opportunity sets” for future generations. This also ensures that economic 
growth remains on a sustainable development path.  Thus, biodiversity policy is also 
linked with policies of “intergenerational equity” and “intergenerational transfer” of 
resources.  Obviously, the present rate of decline of biodiversity imposes a debt to this 
generation in terms of future ecological costs.  The weak form of sustainability requires 
that aggregate capital available to future generations is at least equal to that available to 
the present generation.  Thus, for sustainable development, the opportunity set for future   8
generations should be maintained at a level comparable to that available to the present 
generation (Pearce and Perrings, 1995).  
Changes in the biological resources base have opportunity costs, due to their 
complex ecological linkages.  Therefore, a conservation strategy would be successful in 
economic terms when it is able to resolve these underlying opportunity cost issues. 
Proper understanding of the economic meaning of substitutability of resources (species) 
and the ecological functions and inter-dependence among species is of crucial importance 
to the design of appropriate conservation policy (Pearce and Perrings, 1995).  However, 
our understanding of these topics is very limited.    
Another problem we observe in this context is that a large proportion of 
conservation programs are targeted to the preservation of charismatic species, such as the 
One Horned Rhino, Snow Leopard, Tigers in Asia, Siberian Tiger in Russia, Red Panda 
in China, or the Bald Eagle in the U.S.  Despite the literature that has emphasized the 
importance of biodiversity to maintain the health, resilience, and the evolutionary 
function of ecosystems, in reality these considerations do not receive top priority in the 
planning and design of conservation programs.  
Biodiversity conservation issues have close linkages with development policy, 
and habitats around the world have been changed primarily because of development 
policies targeted to land use, urbanization, infrastructure development, or food 
production, to name a few.  These economic activities alter the food chain and 
hydrological cycles associated with affected ecosystems.  The opportunities forgone as a 
result of these activities will depend on the spatial and temporal spread of the effects of 
biodiversity changes, the degree to which they are reversible, and the potential for species 
substitution (Pearce and Perings, 1995).  Therefore, the quantification of the opportunity 
costs and benefits of biodiversity conservation programs are critical issues requiring 
inter-disciplinary efforts of economists, ecologists, and other scientists.  
 
2.2   Valuation issues 
  Resource valuation is a critical element of resource policy decisions.  Valuation 
depends on the nature of the resource and the institutional context of the use.  Therefore, 
it is natural that there is controversy among professionals as to proper valuation.  For   9
example, the meaning of the word “value” carries different meanings to the ecologist and 
the economist.  In economics, the value of a resource is determined by its marginal use 
value in the production of goods and services
2.  The ecosystem value of a resource (like 
biodiversity) is its value in stabilizing the life support systems which make human 
existence possible (Gowdy, 1997).  Thus, the ecosystem concept suggests an infinite 
value to biodiversity resources when we consider them as a critical factor for the survival 
of humans.  In addition, the ecological concept of use and valuation of biodiversity also 
involves ethical judgements about duty to future generations and responsibility towards 
the non-human natural world.  Economic valuation efforts struggle to take proper account 
of these ethical issues.  
The market value of resources or commodities is based on their relative use, or 
the value of other marketed resources or commodities available to consumers.  Following 
this logic, the market value of a resource (including biodiversity) can only be determined 
by understanding its place within a bundle of alternative choices.  Most mainstream 
economists believe that biodiversity should be considered the same as other resources, 
and for efficient allocation it should also be placed in the basket of market choices just 
like any other resource available to human use (Gowdy, 1997).  Due to the 
substitutability of resource use, human society would not be affected much by the 
depletion of natural resources and species.  They feel that market determinations are 
generally adequate for allocating optimal levels of resources.   
The concept of market allocation of resource is rooted in the anthropocentric use 
value of the resources.  Many others do not agree that valuing natural resources like 
biodiversity with only such anthropocentric measures is adequate.  However, the 
conceptual framework and tools for valuing non-market goods and services are imprecise 
and subject to theoretical and practical debate among analysts.  Therefore, there is a 
fundamental difference between the conceptual approach and the way by which an 
economist views the allocation of resources, including biological diversity, and the 
conceptual approach and the way an ecologist views biodiversity allocation.  Such 
conflicts are also reflected in the policies and programs put forward by different groups. 
                                                                 
2 Non-exploitive uses such as recreation or the option of preserving the resource for future uses are counted 
among the services that might be “produced”.   10 
Economists often fail to understand the meaning and importance of biodiversity resources 
beyond the economic value as indicated by the relative prices determined by market 
exchanges.  Similarly, many ecologists and natural scientists fail to understand the logic 
and importance of efficient allocation of resources by market mechanisms, as is done for 
most other resources, and the requirements of economic development and growth of a 
human society (Gowdy, 1997). 
Ecologists have been arguing for a long time that biological diversity plays a 
crucial role in maintaining the resilience of ecosystems to environmental shocks. 
Therefore, the present trend of declining biodiversity is adversely affecting the 
performance of ecosystems in terms of plant productivity, nutrient retention, water 
retention, decomposition of materials, gaseous composition and climatic changes (Ehrlich 
and Ehrlich, 1992; Tilman and Downing, 1994; Gowdy, 1997).  In addition, preservation 
of the evolutionary potential of ecosystems is another significant issue.  When species 
variability within an ecosystem is reduced by habitat destruction or conversion, system 
modification, and/or genetic erosion of the ecosystem, then the resilience as well as the 
evolutionary potential of the ecosystem is substantially reduced (Gowdy, 1997).  In this 
circumstance, the ecological value of the biological diversity resources would be infinite, 
and there is absolutely no substitute of biodiversity resources (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1992).  
Norton (1988, p. 205) summarizes the value of biodiversity resources in philosophical 
terms as;  
The value of biodiversity is the value of every thing there is. It is the 
summed value of all the GNPs of all countries from now until the end 
of the world.  If biodiversity is reduced sufficiently, and we do not 
know the disaster point, there will no longer be any conscious beings. 
With them go all value -- economic and otherwise.   
  
2.3  Public good nature of biodiversity resources 
  Benefits of biodiversity can be classified in many ways such as, direct and 
indirect, material and spiritual, etc.  In fact, the benefits accrue to individuals, 
communities, and societies both national and international.  Therefore, the total benefits 
of biodiversity conservation programs extend beyond the political boundaries of a nation, 
providing substantial positive global externalities (CBD, 1996b).   Though everyone   11 
shares the benefits of biodiversity, few people sense a personal economic stake in its 
preservation.  Therefore, one of the other major reasons identified for the present level of 
worldwide loss of biodiversity is the public good nature of biodiversity resources.  
Public goods are goods that can be supplied to an additional consumer at no extra 
cost.  In economics jargon they are non-exclusionary – benefits are not the exclusive 
property of any individual or group.  Because of the public good nature of biodiversity 
conservation programs, most of the costs are imposed on the surrounding local 
community, society or nation involved, but the benefits are shared by the rest of the 
world.  This is the reason for over-exploitation of ecological resources and habitat 
conversion, species extinction, systems modification, and so on (Barbier, et al. 1995). 
Thus, one of the major problems of biodiversity conservation programs is the 
management of international public goods. 
The UN Convention on Biodiversity is a reflection of the recognition by the world 
community that biodiversity is a major concern; and it requires effective international 
cooperation to resolve the underlying causes of the problem.  Establishment of the GEF is 
a positive step for managing and sustainable use of an international public good like 
biodiversity.  Similarly, the recent meetings of the CBD and Conventions of Parties (COP 
3 and 4 in 1997 and 1998), have also recognized that creation of appropriate incentive 
structures, or compensation to local communities and/or nations is urgently required to 
save the remaining biodiversity resources on the planet. 
Market failure situations 
Market failures arise if the existing market fails to reflect the full cost and/or 
benefit of a good or service.  In the case of biodiversity the costs of conservation are a 
burden upon the local people or communities surrounding the conservation or protected 
areas; whereas most of the benefits of such programs are shared by larger constituencies.  
The market failure of biodiversity conservation programs results from policies of open 
access for natural resource exploitation and public environmental goods (such as forests).  
Beneficiaries of biodiversity are not isolated, and therefore cannot be made to pay for the 
benefits they derive.  Costs, on the other hand, are paid by the public agency charged 
with the maintenance of the protection program.  The public gaining the benefits and the 
public bearing the costs are often not the same.    12 
The market failure results in an incomplete or missing market.  Market situations 
of this type arise due to lack of information about resource use, distribution of income, 
and assets, and imperfect competition, etc. (Barbier, et al., 1995).  Thus, the market 
failure situation is characterized by a divergence between social cost and social benefit of 
biodiversity resources, and the existing market prices fail to reflect the full social cost and 
benefit of biodiversity.  In an incomplete market, individual decisions for the use of 
biodiversity may be rational from the individual standpoint, given the institutional 
structures and information available at that time, but are sub-optimal from the societal 
standpoint.  The wider the divergence between the social value (cost or benefit) and the 
private value, the more likely we are to destroy biodiversity resources. 
Because of the likelihood that market failures are encountered in resource 
allocation, government interventions are proposed to narrow the gap between private and 
social values (cost and benefit).  The increasing international concern and commitment to 
further international cooperation, though started only in the recent past, are positive steps 
in this regard. 
Policy and  government failures 
Policy failures with respect to biodiversity conservation programs are another 
common problem.  Policy or government failure occurs when the policy intervention 
necessary to correct the underlying market failure problem is inappropriate (Barbier, et 
al., 1995).   Sometimes government policies aimed to correct one kind of market failure 
cause another, such as a subsidy on farming that increases conversion of land thereby 
increasing the loss of ecological resources. 
The nature and extent of government failures vary across countries.  Likewise, 
policy failure contexts in developing countries are different than those encountered in 
developed countries.  In developing countries, policy making institutions are themselves 
often in infant stages, and public participation in the decision making process is 
frequently lacking.  These conditions lead to poorly formulated economic and regulatory 
policies with regard to conservation and use of biodiversity resources.  Some of the major 
problems are excessive subsidies to farming activities, excessive interventions in product 
markets, low stumpage fees on forestry, inadequate provision of property rights for 
natural resources, failures to recognize the traditional common property management   13 
institutions in the policy making process, and so on.  The situation in developed countries 
is not much different in the case of biodiversity conservation.  The consumption and use 
of resources are at a much higher level, which further aggravates pressures on the natural 
resource base worldwide.  
 
2.4     Societal preferences and inadequate information 
The underlying preferences of society influence the public policy setting and 
decision making process.  Society preferences are not stable, rather they change over 
time.  The recent increasing awareness of environmental quality and nature preservation 
agendas in western countries is a reflection of such changing preferences.  The decision 
to preserve biodiversity is fundamentally shaped by the underlying preferences of the 
society.  
Changing preferences limit the scope of economic valuation of biodiversity 
resources.  The utilitarian approach to valuing a resource is based on the continuity of 
preferences.  But, due to ethical or moral issues, or perhaps due to inadequate information 
available at the individual level, it is possible that lexicographic types of discontinuous 
preferences may exist for some individuals for environmental goods like biodiversity 
(Spash and Hanley, 1995).  In that case, we cannot exactly value the biodiversity 
resources from the willingness to accept compensation and willingness to pay framework 
of neoclassical economics (that is, the contingent valuation method).  When some 
individuals behave as having lexicographic preferences, then they may be unwilling to 
trade an increase (decrease) in biodiversity against losses (gains) in income.  This is 
possible when some groups of individuals believe that every animal or species on earth 
has the inalienable right to live.  In that case, the normal demand and supply of the 
market mechanism cannot be used to optimally allocate resources like biodiversity.  
Similarly, the policy instruments of neoclassical economics then fail to bring optimum 
solutions.  Given the assumption of lexicographic preferences, welfare compensation for 
preservation or destruction of biodiversity resources is not feasible. 
Similarly, inadequate information about the exact role of biodiversity with respect 
to the present and future needs of human beings is another problem in managing 
biodiversity resources. The exact characteristics of ecological functions and ecological   14 
resilience capacity of different levels of biodiversity and how it affects humans are 
unsettled issues among ecologists and natural scientists, let alone for an ordinary 
individual in the society at large.  Thus, providing more information about biodiversity to 
the public could increase the perception of value of biodiversity and enhance the public 
willingness to pay for protection. 
Spash and Hanley (1995) reported that lack of knowledge about the meaning of 
biodiversity is prevalent even among university students in the UK.  Based on a random 
sample survey, they reported that the definition and understanding of biodiversity is also 
low in the general public.  Given the lack of understanding prevalent among even the 
educated public in the developed world, except the scientific community, we are not 
surprised that the general public in developing countries attach little value to biodiversity 
and the concern for conserving this international public good.  Hence, the lack of 
information in the general public domain about the role of biodiversity is another major 
constraint to effective policy and program formulation for biodiversity protection. 
 
2.5  Underlying institutions and incentive structures, 
biodiversity and institutional failure 
Institutions are the constraints that structure political, economic, and social 
interaction, and they consist of both informal constraints such as, sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct, and formal rules like constitutions, law, 
property rights, etc. (North, 1991).  Creation of appropriate institutions reduces 
uncertainty in exchange and reduces transaction and production costs, improves 
allocative efficiency, and thus increases the feasibility of engaging in economic activities 
(World Bank, 1991; North, 1991).  Hence, institutions are at the heart of the incentive 
structures of an economy, and as that structure evolves it shapes the direction of 
economic growth (North, 1991).  
Institutional innovations reduce transaction costs which are the source of 
economic growth because they facilitate wealth-enhancing trade (Bromley, 1995). 
Property rights regimes and transactions costs are important factors in institutional 
analysis (North, 1990).  In fact, property rights determine who can participate in decision-
making and ultimately use resources.  For instance, a subsidy or tax cannot be defined   15 
independently of property rights.  Hence, efficient resource use follows only after the 
questions of ownership are answered (Bromley, 1995). 
  It is argued that ecosystems tend to be localized and existing institutions fail to 
incorporate (or internalize) the values of biodiversity conservation activities within the 
decision-making process.  This is the cause of the present level of biodiversity decline 
(Perrings, 1995).  The internalization of these externalities may only be achieved through 
the reform of national and local institutions (Swanson, 1995).   
  There is increasing recognition within the international community and agencies 
involved in development of conservation programs (such as OECD, UNEP, IUCN, and 
the World Bank), that neglect of the institutional factors for designing policy in the past is 
among the major factors leading to the worldwide crisis in biodiversity today.  Hence, an 
institutional approach to study of biodiversity loss, based on the analysis of transaction 
costs, could depict a more holistic picture of the current situation and provide realistic 
policy instruments for better management of biodiversity (CBD, 1996c).  Likewise, 
recently there is greater emphasis on the design and implementation of incentive 
measures that are based on an institutional approach (OECD, 1997a, Vorhies, 1997a).  
Governments’ prevailing macroeconomic policies, including monetary and fiscal 
policies, domestic and international trade policies, etc., that are usually designed for the 
development of the overall economy also have adverse effects (unintended side effects) 
on the conservation and use of biodiversity resources in the economy.  The limited case 
study findings across countries so far available indicate that there is a strong linkage 
between macro policy adopted by a government and environmental deterioration and 
biodiversity loss (Barbier, et al., 1995).  Therefore, to create an effective solution for the 
sustainable use of biodiversity resources, the policy making body must recognize these 
economy-wide effects. 
It is also argued that biodiversity resources have historically been managed as 
common pool resources by the community (Bromley, 1995).  Therefore, community 
participation in the management of these resources is required to obtain optimum 
utilization.  Ostrom (1990) defines a common pool resource as having benefits from 
saving on high exclusion and monitoring costs.  Thus, proper understanding of local 
community institutions is required for conservation and sustainable use of common   16 
property resources like biological diversity.  The strengthening of local institutions and 
active involvement of local communities would also be required to solve the problem of 
the public good nature of resources like biodiversity.  
Bromley and Cernea (1991), based on the review of several World Bank project 
reports, concluded that natural resource projects that do not incorporate the interests of 
local users in developing countries ultimately fail.  Thus, an essential component of 
sustainable development programs is to create a system of incentives and sanctions that 
influence the individual behaviors of those who live in the local area, and who depend 
upon the natural resource in question.  They further state that common property 
institutions are important in natural resources management, and successful conservation 
programs in developing countries must be coincident with the local users’ interest, and 
their active participation in the programs.  This applies to biodiversity management 
programs worldwide.  
Economic incentives and biodiversity conservation 
In the recent meetings of the CBD, the term “incentive measure” is defined as “a 
specific inducement designed and implemented to influence government bodies, 
business, non-government organizations, or local people to conserve biological diversity 
or to use its components in a sustainable manner”(IUCN, 1997).   Incentive measures are 
one of the cross-cutting themes in the Convention on Biodiversity and are now a major 
part of the focused agendas of the recent meetings of the CBD, as well as other 
international forums concerned with biodiversity conservation. 
  Barbier, et al. (1995) stated that the pattern of economic incentives that prevails in 
society is one of the most important factors influencing the use of biodiversity resources.  
Hence, the failure to recognize the economic value of biodiversity and to set up 
appropriate institutions can result in a distortion of economic incentives, which in turn 
leads to excessive loss of biodiversity. They also reported that most of the benefits from 
biodiversity conservation and habitat protection are public rather than private, which 
leads to insufficient private land allocation to conservation from society’s point of view. 
They also reported that distortion of economic incentives by inherent association 
of market and policy failures in biodiversity management projects is one of the major 
underlying factors for the present level of biodiversity loss.  Equally, the failure of   17 
prevailing institutional structures to provide needed incentive structures to stakeholders, 
such as systems of property rights and resource use rights, also lie at the heart of the 
problem of perverse economic incentives for biodiversity conservation.  These may be 
considered institutional failures.  The pattern of economic incentives that exist in a 
society is often very complex and arises from a combination of important driving forces, 
such as institutional and legal factors, culture and ethics, and from the specific 
characteristic of individuals, households and communities (Barbier, et al., 1995).  
Conservation and sustainable use of forest resources and biological diversity also 
depend largely on the political institutions of a nation; how it decides about resource use, 
allocation, distribution and ownership, and benefits sharing from such natural resources 
(Perrings, et al., 1992).  Moreover, through developing appropriate packages of incentive 
measures to conserve biodiversity, a government can improve the livelihood of its 
constituencies, save taxpayers’ money, and ensure a better future for future generations 
(Vorhies, 1996b).  Thus, the economic and institutional analysis of biodiversity 
conservation projects are important for better policy formulation, and to compete for the 
attention of government and commercial decision makers to support interests in nature 
conservation and sustainable development (WRI, 1997b). 
  Similarly, a recent Resources for the Future study reported that biodiversity may 
be important for any number of commercial, ecological, aesthetic, ethical, or even 
spiritual reasons.  However, when it comes to commercial prospecting among national 
sources for new products, the value of biodiversity is not as highly rated as other, more 
tangible, resources.  Therefore, in addition to existing market mechanisms, workable 
incentive measures need to be developed for better conserving biodiversity resources 
(Simpson, 1997). 
 
3.  Biodiversity and economic policy  options 
  As explained above, there is much ambiguity and uncertainty involved with 
biodiversity programs.  This emanates from the incomplete market nature of biodiversity 
resources, and also from inadequate knowledge and lack of understanding among 
ecologists and other natural scientists about ecological functioning and ecosystem 
resilience and their precise relationship with biodiversity.  Traditionally, much of the   18 
emphasis of biodiversity programs has been focused on species preservation and 
controlling or reversing the existing trend of species extinction.  But recently the focus of 
the biodiversity program has shifted from particular organisms to the ecosystem function 
of a mix of organisms (Perrings, 1995).  In this context, some of the major economic 
policy instruments for biodiversity protection discussed in the recent literature are as 
follows.  
3.1  Precautionary principle 
Application of precautionary principles, as the name suggests, implies that some 
“premium” or reserve fund is allocated to intervene in human developmental activities 
affecting the natural environment.  Here, the burden of scientific proof lies with  
environmental disrupters such that their actions will not result in unacceptable ecological 
damage (Barbier, et al., 1995).  Similarly, Perrings (1991) related the “precautionary 
principle” to the notion of reserved rationality, and cautioned policy makers to proceed 
cautiously with an intervention in the natural environment to safeguard against the 
possibilities of unexpectedly severe future costs. 
  This precautionary principle advocates an allocation of a “safeguard allowance,”  
or some “preventive expenditure” that may be required to mitigate any future 
environmental damage associated with the use of environmental resources. (Perrings, 
1991).  Later, Costanza and others have proposed an environmental bond, or interest 
bearing fund, which would later return to the business firm or developer if there were no 
environment damage.  Otherwise, the environmental bond could be used to mitigate the 
environmental damage done by the developer.  
  Perrings (1995) advocated the use of insurance for biodiversity conservation, 
which is basically a premium on managing ecosystem resilience under a given allocation 
of resources.  This is also built on the precautionary principle. However, advocates of 
strong forms of sustainability are not fully satisfied with the precautionary principle. 
They argue that there is no perfect substitution between natural and human made capital, 
so biodiversity loss cannot be compensated by manufactured capital assets. 
 
3.2  Safe minimum standard 
Biodiversity conservation in some sense is the act of setting aside sufficient   19 
reserves to satisfy some set of objectives to satisfy the needs of future generations.  The 
needs of future generations are not reflected in the day to day market arena.  By the 
Brundtland definition of sustainability, the welfare of future generations can only be 
assured if the level of biodiversity they inherit should be no less than that available to 
present generations.  This concept is consistent with maintaining a minimum standard by 
which to judge the acceptability of change. 
The basic notion of safe minimum standard (SMS) rules were first advocated by 
Ciracy-Wantrup in 1952; to preserve sufficient area of habitat to conserve an ecosystem 
unless the costs of doing so are intolerably high (Bishop, 1978).  Thus, the notion of  
SMS has a long history.  Protected area programs for conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity resources worldwide are based on this notion.  
In practice, SMS policy advocates that society should maintain a minimum 
standard of conservation. The present trend of establishing protected areas can be 
justified by the economic theory based on SMS policy.  By adoption of SMS policy for 
conservation worldwide we can avoid many shortcomings of cost benefit analysis.  
However, controversies will still exist about the precise estimation of the minimum 
standard and definition of the intolerable cost level.  
SMS policy imposes a moral premise on the present generation, as it suggests that 
unless the costs are intolerably high the present generation is obligated to protect 
biodiversity.  Thus, the present trend of irreversible extinction of species must be halted 
so future generations should not have to forego the benefits that otherwise extinct species 
would provide.  One of the distinctions of SMS policy is that it advocates rules to keep 
biodiversity beyond the reach of day to day routine market tradeoffs, and its foundation 
lies somewhere between economic and ethical valuation of resources.    
  The decision rule of SMS policy is to maximize net benefit of society provided by 
natural resources, subject to an SMS constraint.  In practice, the levels of SMS 
constraints vary from society to society, and ethical judgements based on several other 
factors.  The available literature on the topic in relation to biodiversity conservation is 
still not clear as to the determination of intolerable costs.  Some authors have 
recommended a rule to decide natural resource use by benefit-cost criteria, but subject to   20 
SMS constraints of conservation, which may satisfy conservation needs on ethical as well 
moral grounds (Randall, 1988; Randall, 1991).  
  Some of the major arguments in support of SMS policy for biodiversity 
conservation, as explained by Barbier, et al. (1995), Randall (1988), and Bishop (1978)  
are the following: 
•  SMS  strategy is considered more pragmatic with respect to the attainment of an 
efficient and sustainable economy, while at the time also taking care of future 
generations. 
•  The criterion of “intolerable cost” also implies some limit on how much society 
should pay for biodiversity conservation. 
•  A SMS strategy is a pragmatic safeguard for biodiversity conservation until 
economies move to a sustainable development path, or societal understanding 
improves.  
•  SMS based biodiversity conservation strategy keeps biodiversity resources 
beyond the scope of normal market tradeoffs, which at present are considered to 
be inadequate to deal with many of the issues of resource use.  
•  Given the present level of uncertainty associated with the function and use of 
biodiversity, and future environmental impacts resulting from today’s economic 
activities, SMS provides a practical framework for biodiversity conservation.   
•  SMS strategy puts limits on economic activities to ensure that they do not impose 
irreversible environmental costs on future generations.  
 
3.3  Institutional reforms providing appropriate incentive structures 
The gap between the social and private values of biodiversity resources explains 
the need for policy to reconcile the differences.  Much of the social value is attributable 
to the global significance of biodiversity resources, while private values are local in 
nature.  Therefore, better understanding of private as well as social benefits and costs of 
biodiversity conservation programs is needed to minimize the externalities associated 
with biodiversity conservation programs.  Because of the pervasive market and policy 
failure situations associated with biodiversity conservation programs, the private costs 
(benefits) and social costs of such conservation activities diverge widely.  Market and   21 
policy failure situations are also associated with existing institutional structures.  
Therefore, the focus of the biodiversity protection issues has recently shifted to analysis 
of existing institutions, and to create incentive structures for the individual and society to 
protect biodiversity resources.  Rather than focusing narrowly on the economic 
instruments, or only token policy reform agendas, the institutional reform process allows 
changing the entire regime or systems, such as legal system reforms, environmental 
sanctions, contract enforcement, etc.  
The institutional framework of a society has an important influence on 
individuals’ decisions concerning the use of resources and thus incentives for biodiversity 
conservation.  Therefore, institutional failure scenarios on international, national and 
local levels need to be assessed and corrected if the present worldwide problem of 
biodiversity loss is to be adequately resolved (CBD, 1996c).  However, the success of 
biodiversity conservation projects in terms of encouraging appropriate economic 
incentives will require greater understanding of the overall institutional context in which 
the project is being implemented (Barbier, et al., 1995; CBD, 1996c).  Similarly, many 
aspects of biodiversity require different levels of institutions and incentive measures to 
various stakeholders for equitable distribution of opportunity costs and benefits of 
conservation. 
Proper analysis and quantification of existing economic incentives and institutions 
are important for policy recommendations for management of natural resources, and also 
will influence the political decision making process at the national and international 
levels (CBD, 1996b).  These analyses are also important for appropriate cooperation and 
involvement of the private sector and local communities.  It is increasingly being 
recognized in the international community that institutional reform processes are 
important, particularly in developing countries, for the conservation and sustainable use 
of environmental resources, and ultimately also to help establish markets for 
environmental goods and services.  
  Efforts to conserve biodiversity in a low-income country must not be pursued in 
isolation but must be complementary to overall economic development.  Just as efficient 
and sustainable use of natural resources is essential to economic development, efforts to 
improve overall economic performance can provide important incentives for increased   22 
conservation.  For example, the “nutrient mining” behavior of farmers in the case of 
frontier agriculture is one of the key factors leading to deforestation and depletion of 
forest biodiversity.  So, in this type of a situation investment to improve agricultural 
productivity is one of the best solutions to the problem of managing biodiversity (Barbier, 
et al., 1995).  Research at Clemson has revealed that a direct correlation exists between 
economic growth and expenditures on environmental protection (Yandle and Qin, 1998).  
  The success of biodiversity conservation programs in protected areas, which are 
the major focus of biodiversity management programs worldwide, largely depends on the 
economic and other incentives available to local stakeholders.  Hence, conservation 
projects need to be designed such that they are sensitive to prevailing socioeconomic 
conditions, and they focus on participation and management by local communities.  
In addition, the problems of biodiversity conservation spread across the boundary 
of one nation or society.  Therefore, the solution of biodiversity problems requires 
national and international understanding, cooperation, and support, and adequate 
compensation to the individual or nation bearing most of the opportunity costs of such 
programs.  Well-managed compensation schemes would provide adequate incentives to 
affected individuals and societies to ensure conservation of biodiversity. 
The present state of biodiversity profoundly affects many facets of life.  
Therefore, a multidisciplinary approach is required to effectively tackle the problems. 
The recent development of ecological economics as a separate discipline, combining the 
efficiency notion of economics and system perspective of ecology, can be viewed as a 
positive step in this direction. 
 
 




Barbier, E.  B. 1993.  Economics and Ecology: New Frontiers and Sustainable 
Development. London: Chapman & Hall Publications.  
 
Barbier, E.B., J.C. Burgess, and C. Folke. 1995.  Paradise Lost? The Ecological 
Economics of Biodiversity. , London: Earthscan Publications.  
 
Bishop, Richard C. 1978.  Endangered species and uncertainty: the economics of safe 
minimum standard. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 60 (1): 10-18 
 
Bromley D.W. and M.M. Cernea. 1991. The Management of Common Property Natural 
Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies. Discussion Paper N. 57, 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Bromley D.W. (ed.). 1995. The Handbook of Environmental Economics. London: 
Blackwell Publications Ltd.  
 
Convention on Biological Diversity. 1996a. Report of the Third Meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Buenos Airs, 
Argentina. 4-14 November 1996.  Available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/cop3/coprep_english.html. 
 
_______________________.1996b. Biological Diversity in Forests: Note by the  
Secretariat. SBSTTA second meeting. Montreal, 2 to 6 September, 1996. Available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/sbstta2/sb211.html 
 
_______________________. 1996c. Sharing of Experiences on Incentive Measures for 
Conservation and Sustainable use: Note by the executive Secretary.  SBSTTA third 




Ehrlich, P. R., and A.H. Ehrlich. 1992. The Value of Biodiversity. AMBIO. Vol. 21 (3): . 
219-226 
Gowdy, J.M. 1997.  The Value of Biodiversity: Market, Society, and Ecosystems.   Land 
Economics. 73(1):25-41. 
  
Hammig M.D. 1994. Socioeconomic Institutions and Environmental Policy Analysis. 
Lecture notes prepared for presentation at the Seminar on Environmental Impact 
Assessment, Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development, Tokyo. 
 
Hanley, N., C. Spash, and L. Walker. 1995.  Problems in Valuing the Benefits of 
Biodiversity Protection. Environmental and Resource Economics. 5(3). 
   24 
 
International Union for Conservation of Nature. 1997.  Incentive Measures. IUCN’s 
publication on Biodiversity. Available at 
http://iucn.org/themes/economics/economics_launch/incentives.htm. 
 
Krutilla, John V. 1967. Conservation Reconsidered. American Economic Review. 57 
(4):777-786. 
 
 McNeely, J.A . 1993. Economic Incentives for Conserving Biodiversity: Lessons for 
Africa. AMBIO.  22(2-3) 
 
Munasinghe, M. 1992.  Biodiversity Protection Policy: Environmental Valuation and 
Distribution Issues. AMBIO. 21(3):227-236 
  
North, D.C. 1991. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 5(1): 97-112. 
 
Norton, B. 1988. Commodity, amenity and morality: The limits of quantification in 
valuing bioidversity. In E. O. Wilson (edt)  Biodiversity. Washington DC. National 
Academy Press. 
 
Norton-Griffiths, M., and C. Southey. 1995.  The Opportunity Costs of Biodiversity 
Conservation in Kenya.  Ecological Economics. 12 (1995): 125-39.  
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1997a. Investing in 
Biological Diversity. Proceedings of the OECD International Conference on Incentive 
Measures for the Conservation  and Sustainable use of Biological Diversity, Cairns, 
Australia, 25-28 March, 1996. Paris: OECD. 
  
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. New York: Cambridge University  Press. 
 
Pearce, D.W. and D. Moran. 1994.  The Economic Value of Biodiversity. London: IUCN 
& Earthscan Publications. Ltd. 
 
Pearce, D.W. and C.A. Perrings. 1995. Biodiversity and economic development: Local 
and global dimensions.  In Perrings, et al. (edts) Biodiversity conservation: Problmes and 
policies. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Perrings, C. 1991. Reserve rationality and the precautionary principle: Technological 
change, time and uncertainty in environmental decision-making. In R. Costanza (edt)  
Ecological Economics: The science and management of sustainability. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
 
Perrings, C. 1993.  Stress, shock and sustainability of optimal resources utilization in a 
stochastic environment. In E.B. Barbier, (edt) Economics and Ecology: New frontiers and 
sustainable development. Chapman & Hall. 
   25 
Perrings, C. 1995. Biodiversity Conservation as Insurance. In Swanson, T. M. (ed.) The 
Economics and Ecology of Biodiversity Decline: The Forces Driving Global Change. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pezzy, J. 1992.  Sustainable development concepts: An economic analysis.  World Bank 
Environmental Papers; No2.  Washington, DC:  The Wold Bank. 
 
Randall, A. 1988. What mainstream economics have to say about the value of 
biodiversity. In  E. Wilson (edt)  Biodiversity. Washington: National Academic Press.  
 
Randall, A. 1991. The value of biodiversity. AMBIO Vol. 20 (2): 64-68. 
 
Rolfe, J.C. 1995. Ulysses revisited- A closer look at the safe minimum standards rule.  
Australian Journal of agricultural Economics Vol. 39 (1): 55-70. 
 
Spash, C.L. and Hanley, N. 1995.  Preferences , Information and Biodiversity 
Preservation: Methodological and ideological options. Ecological Economics. Vol. 
12:191-208 
 
Simpson, R. D. 1997.  Biodiversity Prospecting: Shopping the Wilds is not the key to 
conservation. Resources, Issue No: 123 (1997, Winter):12-15. 
 
Swanson, T.M. (ed.) 1995. The Economics and Ecology of Biodiversity Decline: The 
Forces Driving Global Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tilman, D. and J. Downing. 1994. Biodiversity and stability in grasslands. Nature. 367 
(27 Jan):363-65  
 
United Nations Environment Programs. 1996.  Convention on Biodiversity (1992).  
Available at http://www.unep.ch/bio/conv-e.html  
 
Vorhies,  F. 1996a.  Incentives for Biodiversity.  Presented at a Workshop on Incentives 
for Biodiversity: Sharing Experiences, Montreal, Canada, 30 August- 1 September 1996. 
Available at http://economics.iucn.org 
 
____________. 1996b. From Valuation to Incentives: Implementing Article 11 of the 
Convention on Biodiversity Presented at a Latin America and the Caribbean Regional 
Workshop on Economic Valuation of Biodiversity. 6-10 May, 1996. Santiago, Chile. 
Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.  
 
World Bank. 1991. The World  Development Report, 1991. Washington. DC: The World 
Bank.  
 
World Resources Institute. 1997a. The Values of Biodiversity. Available at 
http://www.wri.org/wri/biodiv/cwb-ii.html 
   26 
_____________________. 1997b. Principles and Guidelines for Planning Biodiversity 
Conservation. Available at http://www.wri.org/wri/biodiv/b10-gbs.html 
 
Yandle, B. and X. D. Qin. 1998. Environmental Kuznets curves, property rights, and 
learning.  Center for Policy and Legal Studies.  Clemson University. 
 
 